Who Is an  Original Source  Under the False Claims Act? by Grenig, Jay E.
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2006
Who Is an "Original Source" Under the False
Claims Act?
Jay E. Grenig
Marquette University Law School, jay.grenig@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Jay E. Grenig, Who Is an "Original Source" Under the False Claims Act?, 34 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct.
Cas. 159 (2006). © 2006 American Bar Association. This information or any portion thereof may
not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic
database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Grenig, Jay E., "Who Is an "Original Source" Under the False Claims Act?" (2006). Faculty Publications. Paper 365.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/365
FALSE CLAIMS
Who Is an "Original Source"
Under the False Claims Act?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 159-164. © 2006 American Bar Association.
Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not available by
PREVIEWs deadline.
ISSUE
Is the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of "original source" in the Federal
False Claims Act correct?
FACTS
From 1978 through 1989, Rockwell
International Corp. (now known as
Boeing North American, Inc.) oper-
ated the Rocky Flats nuclear
weapons plant in Golden, Colorado,
for the U.S. Department of Energy
under a management and operating
contract. Under this arrangement,
Rockwell was compensated on a
"cost-plus" fee basis. The depart-
ment reimbursed Rockwell for
"allowable costs" incurred in operat-
ing the plant. Once a year, Rockwell
received a "base fee" calculated at a
predetermined percentage of the
overall value of the contract. The
most significant portion of
Rockwell's compensation for its
management of Rocky Flats was in
the form of an "award fee"-a bonus
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paid every six months. The amount
of the bonus was based on the
department's evaluation of
Rockwell's performance in such
areas as general management, pro-
duction, and environmental, safety,
and health operations.
In 1980, James Stone began work-
ing at Rocky Flats as a principal
engineer in the Facility's engineer-
ing and construction division. He
was later promoted to lead principal
engineer. In March 1986, Stone was
laid off.
On June 25, 1986, Stone informed
the FBI about environmental crimes
that had allegedly occurred at
Rocky Flats while Stone worked
there. Stone claimed that Rocky
Flats accepted hazardous and
nuclear waste from other depart-
ment facilities; that Rockwell
employees were forbidden from dis-
cussing any controversies in front of
department employees; that
although Rocky Flats' fluid bed
incinerators had failed testing in
1981, the pilot incinerator remained
(Continued on Page 160)
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on line and had been used to incin-
erate waste daily since 1981, includ-
ing plutonium waste that was then
sent out for burial; that Rockwell
distilled and fractionated various
oils and solvents from wastes geared
for incineration; that Stone believed
the ground water was contaminated
from previous waste burial; and that
hazardous waste lagoons tended to
overflow during and after a good
rain, causing hazardous wastes to be
discharged before treatment.
After the FBI obtained a search war-
rant, seventy-five FBI and Environ-
mental Protection Agency agents
conducted a search of Rocky Flats.
Three days after the search, the
FBI's affidavit submitted to obtain
the search warrant was unsealed,
prompting extensive media cover-
age. Denver newspapers reported
that Rocky Flats had illegally
burned and dumped waste.
On July 5, 1989, Stone filed a qui
tam action under the False Claims
Act (FCA), alleging that Rockwell,
while managing Rocky Flats, con-
cealed environmental, safety, and
health problems from the depart-
ment throughout the 1980s. Stone
alleged that Rockwell had violated
numerous federal and state laws and
regulations "[in order to induce the
government to make payments or
approvals" by knowingly presenting,
or causing presentation of, false and
fraudulent claims for payment or
approval to an officer or employee
of the United States government.
These claims included requests for
statements for payment, statements
for reimbursement of costs, and
applications for bonuses. Stone also
alleged that Rockwell knowingly
made, used, or caused to be made
or used, false records or statements
for the purpose of obtaining
approval and payment of these
monies. Stone gave the government
notice of the complaint, but the
United States declined to intervene,
although it reserved the right to do
so at a later date upon a showing of
good cause.
In March 1992, while Stone's FCA
claim was proceeding, Rockwell and
the United States entered into a
plea agreement to conclude a sepa-
rate criminal investigation into
Rockwell's management of Rocky
Flats. Rockwell pled guilty to ten
environmental violations and admit-
ted knowledge of storage and treat-
ment of mixed hazardous wastes
without a permit or interim status
and negligent violation of the Clean
Water Act permit conditions. As
part of its plea, Rockwell agreed to
pay $18.5 million in fines.
In December 1992, Rockwell filed a
motion to dismiss Stone's complaint
on the ground that Stone failed to
satisfy the FCAs requirement that
he be an "original source." On
February 2, 1994, the trial judge
denied Rockwell's motion to dis-
miss, finding that "Mr. Stone had
direct and independent knowledge
that Rockwell's compensation was
linked to its compliance with envi-
ronmental, health and safety regula-
tions and that it allegedly concealed
its deficient performance so that it
would continue to receive pay-
ments," and that Stone had also
made the requisite disclosure of the
relevant information to the govern-
ment before filing his action.
On November 14, 1995, the United
States moved to intervene with
respect to some, but not all of
Stone's FCA allegations. On
November 19, 1996, the trial court
granted the motion to intervene. In
response to a suggestion from the
trial judge, the United States and
Stone amended the complaint to
state six counts against Rockwell:
Count One-a claim under the FCA
brought by both the United States
and Stone; Counts Two through
Five-claims for common law fraud,
breach of contract, payment by mis-
take of fact, and unjust enrichment
brought by the United States alone;
Count Six-a claim under the FCA
alleging Rockwell knowingly pre-
sented or caused to be presented to
the government false or fraudulent
claims for money or property
brought by Stone alone.
A jury trial was held on Counts One
through Five. The verdict form
asked the jury to answer the ques-
tion: "Did the plaintiffs prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant Rockwell
International Corporation violated
the False Claims Act to get one or
more of the following claims under
the Department of Energy-Rockwell
contracts paid or approved?" The
verdict form required the jury to
answer that question for each of ten
six-month periods running from
October 1, 1986, through December
30, 1989, each corresponding to an
"Award Fee Period" or a period for
which Rockwell received "Vouchers
Accounting for Net Expenditures
Accrued."
The jury returned verdicts for
Rockwell on the breach of contract
claim and on seven of the ten FCA
claims in Count One. The jury
found for the plaintiffs on the three
remaining FCA claims and awarded
$1,390,775.80 in damages. After the
jury verdict, the plaintiffs tendered
a proposed form of judgment that
included Stone as a party in whose
favor judgment should be entered,
in accordance with the principles of
a qui tam action. Rockwell then
filed a post-trial memorandum argu-
ing that Stone was not an "original
source" and thus was not entitled to
have judgment entered in his favor
or to recover attorney's fees and
expenses. The trial judge rejected
Rockwell's argument. On June 10,
1999, the district court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
on the three FCA claims in the
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amount of $4,172,327 (treble dam-
ages are permitted under the FCA).
The court also awarded the United
States a $15,000 civil penalty under
the FCA.
Rockwell appealed, arguing that,
among other things, the trial court
erred in finding that Stone was an
original source of the information
on which the FCA allegations were
based with respect to claims regard-
ing the allegedly faulty process for
manufacturing pondcrete. Pondcrete
is manufactured by mixing sludge
from solar evaporation ponds with
Portland cement, pouring the mix-
ture into large boxes, and allowing it
to solidify. The plaintiffs had argued
that the pondcrete blocks at Rocky
Flats failed to solidify because
Rockwell employees cut the amount
of cement being added to the
mixture.
A divided three-judge panel of the
Tenth Circuit held that Stone had
satisfied the statutory requirement
of disclosure United States ex rel.
Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 92
Fed. Appx. 708 (10th Cir. 2004).
Ruling that Stone was an "original
source" within the meaning of the
FCA, the Tenth Circuit held Stone
had adduced sufficient competent
proof to establish that he had direct
and independent knowledge of the
information on which his FCA claim
was based. The Tenth Circuit said
that review of the record convinced
it that Stone had been specific and
detailed in showing how he
obtained, through his own efforts
and not through the labors of oth-
ers, direct and independent knowl-
edge that Rockwell's designs for
manufacturing ponderete blocks
would result in the release of toxic
waste.
The court pointed out that Stone had
supplied the trial court with an affi-
davit detailing his duties and respon-
sibilities at Rocky Flats and describ-
ing the observations underpinning
his FCA action. In his affidavit,
Stone declared that he had commu-
nicated his concerns about the pond-
crete manufacturing process to
Rockwell's management in an engi-
neering order dated October 13,
1982. The engineering order explicit-
ly articulated Stone's belief that the
proposed design for making pond-
crete was flawed and suggested a
pilot operation be designed to simpli-
fy and optimize each phase of the
operation. The Tenth Circuit noted
that, despite Stone's warning,
Rockwell went forward and manufac-
tured ponderete using the allegedly
deficient procedure.
The Tenth Circuit found it signifi-
cant that Stone provided a confiden-
tial disclosure statement dated July
5, 1989, to the government, detail-
ing how he became aware of
Rockwell's allegedly faulty process
for manufacturing pondcrete.
Moreover, the court noted that in
his disclosure statement, Stone
described how Rockwell had forbid-
den him from discussing any envi-
ronmental problems at Rock Flats
with the Department of Energy.
The court stated that the informa-
tion from Stone was sufficiently spe-
cific to satisfy the standard for an
"original source" set out in the FCA.
The court determined that Stone
had clearly articulated in his affi-
davit and disclosure statement that
he had learned the facts underlying
his claim by reviewing Rockwell's
plans for producing ponderete.
Thus, the court said Stone had suffi-
ciently alleged specific facts-as
opposed to mere conclusions-
showing exactly how and when he
had obtained direct and indepen-
dent knowledge of the fraudulent
acts alleged in the complaint and
supported those allegations with
competent proof.
The Tenth Circuit rejected
Rockwell's argument that Stone
must have direct and independent
knowledge of the actual fraudulent
submission to the government. The
court stated that, for Stone to be an
original source, Stone need only
possess "direct and independent
knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based."
The court explained that the phrase
"information on which the allega-
tions are based" means "the infor-
mation underlying or supporting the
fraud allegations contained in the
plaintiffs qui tam complaint." The
court said there was a distinction
between the actual act of fraud and
the facts underlying or giving rise to
the fraud.
According to the Tenth Circuit,
Stone was not required to have
knowledge of the fraudulent conduct
itself; knowledge underlying or sup-
porting the fraud allegation is suffi-
cient. The court concluded that
Stone's knowledge that a defective
ponderete manufacturing process
would be employed, gained from his
review of Rockwell's plans, consti-
tuted knowledge of information
"underlying or supporting" his alle-
gation concerning Rockwell's alleged
ultimate fraudulent activity-the
submission of claims to the
Department of Energy falsely stating
that Rocky Flats was in compliance
with environmental, health, and
safety laws.
The court also rejected Rockwell's
argument that Stone could not be
an original source for the ponderete
claim because he no longer worked
at Rocky Flats when the manufac-
ture of ponderete blocks com-
menced. The court reasoned that
the gravamen of Stone's claim was
that he learned from studying
Rockwell's plans for manuiacturin
that the blocks would leak toxic
waste. The court said the fact that
(Continued on Page 162)
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Stone was not physically present at
Rocky Flats when production began
was immaterial to the relevant ques-
tion-whether Stone had direct and
independent knowledge of the infor-
mation underlying his claim.
The court did not find persuasive
Rockwell's argument that Stone
could not have had direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of the informa-
tion on which his ponderete claim
was based because it is preposterous
to think the alleged defects in
design Stone identified in his review
of the designs later caused solidity
defects in the ponderete blocks.
Declaring that whether the alleged
design flaws noted by Stone in his
engineering report actually caused
the production of malformed pond-
crete blocks was immaterial, the
court said that the issue of whether
a claim is ultimately flawed on the
merits is for the finder of fact to
determine.
The Tenth Circuit also ruled that
Stone had satisfied the requirement
that he disclose the information
underlying his claims to the govern-
ment before bringing suit against
Rockwell. The court found that
Stone had produced a document in
his confidential disclosure
Statement on which he had stated
his belief that the proposed design
form making the pondcrete was
flawed, and that the document had
been produced to the government
before suit was filed.
The dissenting judge asserted that
Stone could not establish that he
qualified as an original source.
Acknowledging that Stone had
accurately predicted in a 1982 engi-
neering order that Rockwell's pro-
posed design for making pondcrete
would not work, the judge explained
there was no evidence that Stone
directly and independently knew
that Rockwell actually experienced
problems when it began producing
pondcrete or that Rockwell con-
cealed the resulting environmental
problems from the Department of
Energy.
On September 26, 2006, the
Supreme Court granted Rockwell's
petition for a writ of certiorari limit-
ed to the question of whether the
Tenth Circuit erred by affirming the
entry of judgment in favor of James
Stone, who was a qui tam relator
under the FCA, based on a misinter-
pretation of the statutory definition
of an "original source" as set forth
in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). 127 S.Ct.
35 (2006).
CASE ANALYSIS
Originally enacted in 1863, the
Federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 et seq.) imposes civil liability
upon any person who, among other
things, knowingly presents or causes
to be presented to an officer or
employee of the United States gov-
ernment a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval. The defen-
dant is liable for up to treble dam-
ages and a civil penalty of up to
$15,000 per claim.
An FCA action may be commenced
in one of two ways. First, the gov-
ernment may bring an action under
§ 3730(a) against the alleged false
claimant. Second, under § 3730(b),
a private person (the relator) may
bring a civil action known as a qui
tam action "for the person and for
the United States Government"
against the alleged false claimant "in
the name of the government." (Qui
tam is an abbreviation for the Latin
phrase qui tam pro domine nege
qua pro sic ipso in hoc sequitur,
meaning "who pursues this action
on our Lord the King's behalf as well
as his own." It is called a qui tam
action because the plaintiff states
that he sues for the government and
for himself.) The relator receives a
share of any proceedings from the
action-generally between 15 per-
cent to 25 percent if the govern-
ment intervenes in the action and
from 25 percent to 30 percent if it
does not.
A "claim" means any request or
demand, whether under a contract
or otherwise, for money or property
that is made to a contractor,
grantee, or other recipient if the
United States government provides
any portion of the money or proper-
ty that is requested or demanded.
The FCA reaches beyond claims
that might be legally enforced to all
fraudulent attempts to cause the
government to pay out sums of
money.
In 1943, the Supreme Court held an
individual could bring a qui tam
action even if the individual had
contributed nothing to the discov-
ery of the fraud. United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
545-46 (1943). Congress subse-
quently amended the False Claims
Act to provide that a court "shall
have no jurisdiction to proceed with
any such [qui tam] suit ... whenev-
er it shall be made to appear that
such suit was based upon evidence
in the possession of the United
States, or any agency, officer or
employee thereof, at the time such
suit was brought."
In 1984, the Supreme Court held
that a state's qui tam action was
barred because the state had provid-
ed the government with reports
about the defendant's fraudulent
activity as required by law before
filing the action. Thereafter,
Congress amended the FCA to pro-
vide that no court shall have juris-
diction over a qui tam action based
on public information unless "the
person bringing the action is an
original source of the information."
The FCA defines an "original
source" as "an individual who has
direct and independent knowledge
of the information on which the
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allegations are based and who has
voluntarily provided the information
to the government before filing an
action under this section which is
based on the information."
Rockwell argues that what it calls
the "Tenth Circuit's expansive inter-
pretation of the original source
exception" cannot be reconciled
with the significant limitations
Congress imposed on qui tam suits.
Rockwell reasons that the need for
qui tam actions is at its lowest ebb
when enough information has been
publicly revealed to put both the
government and the public on
notice that a fraud may have been
committed. According to Rockwell,
at that point, the government can
compel would-be relators to cooper-
ate without the need for a promise
of a bounty.
Rockwell asserts that through
amendments to the FCA, Congress
sought to achieve the golden mean
between adequate incentives for
whistle-blowing insiders with gen-
uinely valuable information and dis-
couragement of opportunistic plain-
tiffs who have no significant infor-
mation of their own'to contribute.
Rockwell says an expansive reading
of the original source exception
would disrupt the careful balance
that Congress sought to achieve.
It is Rockwell's position that the
Tenth Circuit erroneously held that
Stone had "direct and independent
knowledge of the information on
which the allegations" were based.
According to Rockwell, no other cir-
cuit besides the Tenth has allowed a
relator to escape the public disclo-
sure bar "with merely some infor-
mation 'underlying or supporting'
his fraud allegations."'
Rockwell explains that the FCA first
requires a court to identify the core
information on which the allega-
tions of the relator's FCA action are
based in order to assess the suffi-
ciency of the relator's knowledge of
that information. Rockwell claims
that the information Stone claimed
to have known was woefully inade-
quate to qualify him as an original
source. Rockwell also asserts that
Stone abandoned his original theory
of the cause of the ponderete prob-
lems and asserted a new theory that
was inconsistent with Stone's sup-
posed "direct and independent"
knowledge. Rockwell says that
Congress did not intend for courts
to assess a relator's original source
status merely by reviewing the alle-
gations contained in a superseded
initial complaint.
Second, Rockwell argues that a court
must determine whether the relator's
knowledge of the relevant informa-
tion is "direct and independent."
Declaring that the information must
not depend or rely on the public dis-
closures and must be first-hand
knowledge, Rockwell asserts that the
Tenth Circuit erroneously held that
Stone's "highly inferential predic-
tions of inferences of future events"
qualified as "direct knowledge."
Third, Rockwell says a court must
determine if the relator's "direct and
independent knowledge" is suffi-
cient. Rockwell contends the Tenth
Circuit embraced a loose require-
ment that a relator must simply
have direct and independent knowl-
edge of some "information underly-
ing or supporting the fraud allega-
tions." Rockwell says the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation is inconsis-
tent with the basic requirements
imposed by other circuits that the
relator's knowledge must be knowl-
edge of the particular fraud.
According to Rockwell, Stone can-
not qualify as an original source
under any reasonable interpretation
of the FCA. Rockwell claims that
the record overwhelmingly demon-
strates that Stone did not have
direct and independent knowledge
sufficient to show either the false
statements on which his action was
based or the actual facts rendering
those statements false. Rockwell
says that Stone did not have any
information that was "essential,"
"substantive," or "core" to estab-
lishing those issues.
Noting that an original source must
have "voluntarily provided the infor-
mation to the government before fil-
ing an action" under the FCA,
Rockwell argues that Stone failed to
provide sufficient information to the
government. According to Rockwell,
Stone's engineering order did not
contain sufficient information to
satisfy the requirements of the FCA.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits
have held that the FCA does not
require that a qui tam relator pos-
sess direct and independent knowl-
edge of all the vital ingredients to a
fraudulent transaction. See United
States ex rel. Springfield Terminal
Ry. V Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir.
1994); United States ex rel. King v.
Hillcress Health Center, Inc., 264
F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States ex rel. Minnesota Ass'n of
Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health
Systems Corp., 276 F.3d 1032 (8th
Cir. 2002). The Third Circuit in
United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v.
Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186
F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999), held that in
order to qualify as an "original
source," the relator must have first-
hand knowledge about "the most
critical element of its claims, viz.,
that the Authority had made the
alleged misrepresentations to HUD"
regarding its paint abatement
program.
The Tenth and D.C. Circuits qualify
a relator as an original source if the
relator has sufficient knowledge of
either the statement to the govern-
(Continued on Page 164)
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ment or the true state of affairs
showing it to be false. The Eighth
Circuit requires only knowledge of
falsity.
The Second and Ninth Circuits have
held that a relator must have direct-
ly or indirectly been a source to the
entity that publicly disclosed the
allegations on which a suit is based.
United States ex rel. Dick v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d
Cir. 1990); United States ex rel.
Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.id 1412
(9th Cir. 1992). Other circuits have
rejected that view. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Mistick PBT v.
Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186
F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
A decision affirming the Tenth
Circuit may make it easier for indi-
viduals bringing qui tam suits to
establish that a court has subject
matter jurisdiction. A decision
reversing the Tenth Circuit may
reduce the incentives for whistle-
blowing insiders with information to
make the information public.
However, a reversal may also dis-
courage opportunistic plaintiffs who
have no significant information to
contribute of their own from bring-
ing qui tam suits.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Petitioner Rockwell
International Corp. (Maureen E.
Mahoney (202) 637-2200)
For Respondent United States (Paul
D. Clements, Solicitor General
(202) 514-2217)
For Respondent James S. Stone
(Maria T. Vullo (212) 373-3000.)
AMICUS BRIEFS (AS OF
NOVEMBER 17, 2006)
In Support of Rockwell
International Corp.
American Hospital Association et
al. (Catherine E. Stetson (202) 637-
5491)
BP America Production Co. et al.
(Donald Earl Childress III (202)
879-3939)
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States et al. (Herbert L.
Fenster (202) 496-7500)
Comstock Resources, Inc.
(William Scott Hastings (214) 740-
8000)
National Defense Industrial
Association (Alan A. Pemberton
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